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Undocumented Immigrants and Their
Personal Injury Actions: Keeping
Immigration Policy Out of Lost Wage
Awards and Enforcing the
Compensatory and Deterrent
Functions of Tort Law
Immigration is by definition a gesture of faith in social
mobility. It is the expression in action of a positive belief in the
possibility of a better life. It has thus contributed greatly to
developing the spirit of personal betterment in American society
and to strengthening the national confidence in change and the
future. Such confidence, when widely shared, sets the national
tone. The opportunities that America offered made the dream real,
at least for a good many; but that dream itself was in large part the
product of millions of plain people beginning a new life in the
conviction that life could indeed be better, and each new wave of
immigration rekindled the dream.
John F. Kennedy1
I. INTRODUCTION
Today approximately 10.5 million undocumented immigrants
2
1. JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 67-68 (1964).
2. For the purposes of this article, the population of immigrants who do
not have documentation to reside legally in the United States will be referred
to as "undocumented immigrants." Besides the negative social implications
associated with the term, referring to a portion of the population as "illegal"
can be equated with assuming one is guilty until proven innocent. See
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1192 (4th
ed. 2002). When such dangerous assumptions are made, they negate the
viability of immigration laws because just as in other areas of the law, people
who must navigate through immigration proceedings may have valid legal
claims which afford them remedies under the law. See id. Furthermore, the
term "alien" even when used alone, carries its own negative implications. Id.
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live within the borders of the United States and the number keeps
growing.3  The undocumented population is increasing at the
average rate of 408,000 people per year.4  Combined with the
documented population, the immigrant population is at its largest
level in history and continues to increase.5 It is against this
backdrop that the topic of immigration receives extensive publicity
via the media and, with the advent of the internet, public opinion
is much more accessible. 6 While at first glance, public sentiment
about immigrants appears increasingly negative, public opinion
fluctuates dramatically over short periods of time.7 This wavering
opinion of and uncertainty about the immigrant population is not
surprising, however, considering that the factual basis on which
such opinions are premised is mixed and inconsistent at best.8
The term is isolationist, relegating even "legal" immigrants to the outer
fringes of our society. Id.
3. MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT
POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Jan. 2005),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ILL PE-2005.pdf.
4. Id.
5. MARC J. PERRY ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MIGRATION OF NATIVES
AND THE FOREIGN BORN: 1995 TO 2000, at 1 (Aug. 2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-1l.pdf. The total immigrant
population (documented and undocumented) in 2000 was 31.1 million, an
increase of 57% in 10 years. Id.
6. The advent of the internet perhaps allows more fringe views on
immigration to be accessible to the average citizen. There are innumerable
websites devoted to anti-immigration policy which might give rise to an
inference that Americans are anti-immigrant. See, e.g., Border Guardians,
http://www.borderguardians.org (promoting the burning of Mexican flags at
anti-immigration rallies); Boycott Mexico, http://www.boycottmexico.com
(calling Mexico the "neighbor from hell"); NoInvaders.org, http://
www.NoInvaders.org (listing the names, addresses and related information of
companies across the United States that allegedly hire undocumented
immigrants).
7. In a recent Gallup Poll, people were asked whether they favored
reducing immigration. Only 39% of respondents to the June 2006 poll
favored a reduction in immigration. See Gallup's Pulse of Democracy:
Immigration, http://www.galluppoll.com/content/?ci=1660. Compare this
number with the results of the same poll in April 2006, in which 47% of
respondents favored reducing immigration. Id. The number fluctuated, at
times erratically, from 58% in October 2001 to 49% in 2002 to 38% in 2000,
for example. Id.
8. Discourse as to the actual effects of immigration on the economic,
social and environmental areas of American life is diverse. There is no
consensus. Is it a wonder Americans are confused? For example, some argue
2008]
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This inconsistency seeps not only into the minds of Americans
but also into the law. While controlling immigration, with an
emphasis on undocumented immigration, is the traditional focus
of immigration law, 9 there is an insidious movement to address
immigration issues through the back door of tort law by denying
undocumented immigrants a full course of remedies for their
injuries. 10  Specifically, attempts have been made to deny
undocumented immigrants the right to collect lost wages11 in
personal injury actions with varying results. 12  The result of
focusing on immigration policy when awarding lost wages in tort
actions is nothing less than erratic. 13  Some undocumented
immigrants are denied any right to collect lost wages, 14 whereas
others are allowed to collect lost wages based on American wage
rates, 15 while yet others are allowed to establish lost wages based
that immigration causes economic disadvantage for low-skilled Americans
who must compete for jobs with immigrants, see, e.g., GEORGE J. BORJAS,
HEAVEN'S DOOR - IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 63-64
(1999), while others argue that American workers are utilized in a more
productive fashion, resulting in an efficiency that is beneficial to the
economy. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, THE NEW AMERICANS - ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL
EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 4-8 (James P. Smith et al. eds., 1997). As for social
implications, some argue that we cannot be a sovereign nation because we
are too diverse, see, e.g., PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION - COMMON SENSE
ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION DISASTER 209-11 (1995), while others argue
that it is our unique cultural differences that unify us. See, e.g, Stephen J.
Legomsky, Immigrants, Minorities and Pluralism: What Kind of Society Do
We Really Want?, 6 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL. 153, 160-61 (1998).
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part III.A-D.
11. For purposes of this article, the term "lost wages" includes both past
and future lost wages unless otherwise indicated.
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. See Veliz v. Rental Serv. Corp. USA, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1334
(D. Fla. 2003).
15. See Hernandez v. M/V Rajaan, 848 F.2d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 1988);
Barros v. E.W. Bliss Co., Civ. A. No. 91-126330Z, 1993 WL 99930, at *2 (D.
Mass. 1993); Hagl v. Stern, 396 F. Supp. 779, 779 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Balbuena
v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1260 (N.Y. 2006); Majlinger v. Cassino
Contracting Corp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 56, 70 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2005), aff'd sub
nom. Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246 (2006); Collins v. N.Y.
City Health and Hosp. Corp., 607 N.Y.S.2d 387, 388 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1994); Klapa v. O&Y Liberty Plaza Co., 645 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282 (Sup. 1996);
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W.3d 233, 247 (Tex. App. 2003); Peterson
v. Neme, 281 S.E.2d 869, 874 (Va. 1981).
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on the wage rates of their country of origin. 16  The focus on
immigration policy thus negates the compensatory nature of tort
law by inadequately and sporadically compensating
undocumented immigrants for injuries they suffer as a result of
another's negligence.
As a hypothetical example, assume Ms. A, an undocumented
immigrant from Guatemala, has resided in Rhode Island for 12
years. Ms. A has worked all twelve years at a local mill on a full-
time basis at the rate of $8.00 per hour. While walking home from
work one evening, she is hit by a drunk driver. Ms. A sustains
serious injuries and is out of work for one year, losing over
$16,000.00 in wages. Under the present system of awarding lost
wages, there are three possible outcomes to this scenario. First,
Ms. A finds herself before a court whose primary agenda is
promoting federal immigration policy and is thus denied lost
wages because she is in the country illegally. Alternately, Ms. A
finds herself before a court that tries to balance tort policy and
federal immigration policy resulting in an award of past lost
wages based on the rate of pay she would earn in Guatemala,
$2.00 per hour, leaving her with a lost wage award of
approximately $4,000.00. Finally, Ms. A finds herself before of a
court whose interest in a personal injury case is to abide by the
compensatory and deterrence functions of tort law, in which case
Ms. A is granted the opportunity to collect lost wages based on
American wage rates, thus being fully compensated for her injury.
This Note argues that whether or not an immigrant is
documented or undocumented, lost wage awards in personal
injury actions should always be based on American wage rates.
There is no legal basis for denying undocumented immigrants lost
wage awards based on American wage rates in personal injury
actions. The Supreme Court has never decided such a case. In
addition, while the Federal Government is responsible for
developing immigration law and policy, awarding lost wages to
undocumented immigrants in personal injury actions is not
preempted by federal immigration policy. Finally, when the
16. See Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. Civ. A. 01-1241-JTM, 2003
WL 22519678, at *7 (D. Kan. 2003); Sanango v. 200 East 16th St. Housing
Corp., 788 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316-19 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2004); Jallow v. Kew
Gardens Hills Apartments Owners, No. 28907/2003, 2005 WL 1712206, at *2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
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courts fail to award lost wages based on American wage rates, the
compensatory and deterrent functions of tort law, which should be
the primary consideration in personal injury cases, are completely
diminished. Not only do lost wage awards based on an
undocumented immigrant's home country wage rates diminish the
efficacy of tort principles, but they also hinder the enforcement of
immigration law. Awarding lost wages based on American wage
rates serves a dual purpose in the enforcement of immigration
law. First, it serves as a deterrent for employers who might
otherwise be willing to hire undocumented immigrants to work in
unsafe working conditions and take the risk knowing that even if
an immigrant is injured, the employer may not have to pay lost
wages. Second, even when the negligent party is not an employer,
the backlash employers might face when a negligent party is
forced to pay an undocumented immigrant lost wages serves as a
secondary deterrence function which promotes immigration policy.
Part II of this Note outlines the historical development of the
areas of immigration law and tort law, delineating the unique
policies driving each area of the law. Part III of this Note
examines the issue of awarding lost wages to undocumented
immigrants and the bases of analysis in addressing the manner
and method of awards. Specifically, there is a close examination
of the Supreme Court case of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB 17 and a discussion of why this lost wage case arising out of
a conflict between two federal labor law statutes is not applicable
to tort actions. Further, this Note addresses the preemption
argument against awarding lost wages. This Note analyzes how,
in fact, lost wage awards in personal injury actions are not
preempted by federal immigration policy. Part III of this Note
examines the policy arguments supporting awards of lost wages to
undocumented immigrants. This Note concludes with the
suggestion that lost wage awards in personal injury cases of
undocumented immigrants should always be based on American
wage rates in order to promote the policies of tort law and that,
further, in promoting tort policy, immigration law and policy will
be best served.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAw AND TORT LAw IN
17. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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THE UNITED STATES
A. Evolution of Immigration Law
1. Early Developments
Prior to the 1800s, immigration law was primarily committed
to the control of the states.1 8 Immigration legislation was largely
unnecessary in a fledgling nation in need of populating itself.19
The policy of the time was come one, come all.2 ° Unspoken
promises of religious freedom and a tolerant government induced
immigrants to leave their homelands. 2 1 With undeveloped land
and a new world came the knowledge that a hard-working person
could create a new life and accumulate wealth.22 States passed
few anti-immigration laws at this time because of the need for and
value of labor.23 Furthermore, early attempts by the federal
government to restrict immigration met with animosity. 24 Thus,
federal regulation was generally restricted to pro-immigrant
legislation.25  Under this policy of promoting the growth of a
fledgling country, the nation grew exponentially. 26 From 1790 to
1850 approximately 2,515,000 foreigners migrated to the United
States.
27
18. LEGOMSKY, supra note 2, at 2.
19. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.02[1]
(2004).
20. Id. There is some dissent as to how inclusive immigration laws were
even under state control. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of
American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1835-36
(1993) (arguing that immigration was not as unrestricted as today's scholars
purport it to be).
21. EMBERSON E. PROPER, COLONIAL IMMIGRATION LAws: A STUDY OF THE
REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION BY THE ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA 9-10
(2003).
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id. at 17.
24. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.02[1]. The Alien Act of 1798 gave the
President power to remove any alien he thought to be dangerous from the
U.S. Id. The Act was allowed to lapse after a two year time period because it
was so unpopular. Id.
25. Id. For example, in 1819 federal legislation controlling conditions on
ships carrying immigrants to the U.S. was passed. Id.
26. Id.
27. GEORGE M. STEPHENSON, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION: 1820-
1924, at 99 (1926).
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With the late 1800s came increased involvement by the
federal government in the area of immigration. The first general
immigration law28 enacted by the Federal Government was a tax
of 50 cents imposed on any non-citizen passenger coming by ship
to the United States.29 During this time period, labor groups were
organizing with an agenda focused on limiting the influx of
contracted labor from outside of the United States. 30 While the
agenda was focused on labor issues, much of the labor group
agendas also carried racial undertones. 3 1 Under the pressure of
labor groups and other anti-immigrant proponents, the rise of
immigration restriction began in 1882 with the enactment of the
Chinese Exclusion Act,32 which banned the entry of Chinese
laborers into the United States. 33 In 1885, Congress passed a
law34 to discourage the importation of foreign laborers unless they
were needed for a new industry in which there was unmet
demand. 35  The law was amended in 188836 to allow for
deportation of certain contract laborers. 3 7 It is important to note
that much of this legislation passed during a period of time in
which depletion of open land and the competitive labor force was
28. Act of August 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214.
29. STEPHENSON, supra note 27, at 142.
30. Id. at 143.
31. ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882, at 17 (2004). In the 1870s,
the National Labor Union promoted the restriction of Chinese immigration,
pressuring legislatures to stop the "evil" presence of Chinese laborers in the
United States. Id. at 16-17.
32. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58.
33. DANIELS, supra note 31, at 19. The Chinese Exclusion Act included a
provision that any Chinese person who was in the United States on
November 17, 1880 or had come to the United States between November 17,
1880 and August 4, 1882 could leave the United States and return. Id. This
provision was repealed in 1888, leaving many Chinese unable to return to the
United States even though they fell within the date requirement of the
Chinese Exclusion Act. Id. at 20. While the repealing act was challenged in
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, the resulting decision produced further
restrictions on immigration law with the court reasoning that exclusion of
non-citizens was not a question for the judiciary, being a political issue and
incident to sovereignty. See 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
34. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332.
35. STEPHENSON, supra note 27, at 143.
36. Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 566.
37. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.02[2].
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increasing. 38 Thus, the open policy of immigration which incited
development of a nation quickly turned into immigration control.
Even during this time period, the focal point of many of the
immigration laws was not only centered on labor but, more
importantly, on employers. 39 Finally, in 1891, immigration came
under federal control4 ° with the creation of the Bureau of
Immigration.
4 1
While earlier legislation generally focused on labor and
employment issues, the development of the Bureau of
Immigration brought about an even more exclusionist
immigration policy. The Bureau's creation incidentally occurred
in the "depression-scarred" 1890s. 42 The 1891 act that created the
Bureau also excluded from entering the United States various
groups including paupers, people suffering from contagious
diseases, and people convicted of crimes of moral turpitude. 4 3 The
act further called for deportation proceedings against anyone who
entered the country illegally.4 4  In 1903, the list of excludable
immigrants grew to include such groups as beggars and
epileptics. 4 5 In 1907, the feeble-minded and children without
parents were added to the ever-growing list of excludable
immigrants. 46 While exclusion of the above classes of immigrants
was originally intended to limit entry for those immigrants who
were unable, due to physical or mental health problems, to care
for themselves, the restrictions ultimately were used to exclude
physically and mentally capable but poor immigrants.
4 7
Restrictive immigration regulation reached its zenith in 191748
with the passage of legislation requiring a literacy test for all
38. STEPHENSON, supra note 27, at 145.
39. See DANIELS, supra note 31, at 28. Laws made it unlawful for
employers to contract with or import immigrants, publish advertising that
promoted immigration with promises of work or to pay for the importation of
immigrants to the U.S. See STEPHENSON, supra note 27, at 145-48.
40. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.
41. See DANIELS, supra note 31, at 29.
42. Id. at 11.
43. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.02[2].
44. Id.
45. Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch.' 1012, 32 Stat. 1213.
46. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898.
47. DANIELS, supra note 31, at 28.
48. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874.
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incoming immigrants. 49  While the earlier exclusionist laws
targeted what were thought to be "undesirables,"50 the literacy
test was a general restriction on all immigrants to the United
States signaling a nuanced shift in immigration policy in the
United States. Even though the literacy test was only enacted in
1917, it was discussed and promoted as early as 1912,51 at which
time immigration was reaching its peak. 52 Compounding the
problem was the fact that World War I brought with it a sharp
decrease in immigration, 53 but people realized that the end of the
War would bring along with it refugees from war-torn, ravaged
countries, 54 resulting in mass immigration. Thus, the political
climate of the times facilitated passage of the literacy
requirement. While the literacy requirement was ineffective in
limiting immigration to the United States, its significance lay in
.the fact that it garnered overwhelming support despite its
restrictionist nature. 55
By the end of World War I, immigration began to increase but
not at the "flood" rates that many anticipated.56 Even so, the
trend of restrictionist immigration policy continued influenced
largely by the post-war economic depression. 57  Many of the
unemployed were war veterans, and this fact combined with the
threat of jobs being taken away from these men by immigrants,
stirred up "anti-immigrant hysteria."58 At this time the United
States adopted a quota system59 to control immigration, beginning
49. DANIELS, supra note 31, at 46.
50. STEPHENSON, supra note 27, at 156.
51. See id. at 161.
52. 9.9 million immigrants entered the United States from 1905 to 1914,
more than any other ten year period in the history of immigration. DANIELS,
supra note 31, at 45.
53. STEPHENSON, supra note 27, at 157.
54. See DANIELS, supra note 31, at 45-47; STEPHENSON, supra note 27, at
157-58.
55. See DANIELS, supra note 31, at 46-47.
56. See STEPHENSON, supra note 27, at 178. 805,228 immigrants entered
the United States by fiscal year end June 30, 1921, a lower number of
immigrants than had entered the United States before the start of World
War I when the average rate of entry between 1910 and 1914 was over one
million immigrants per year. Id. It seems that fear of a mass immigration
was unfounded.
57. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.02[3).
58. See DANIELS, supra note 31, at 47.
59. The quota systems have always generated interesting scholarly
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with the Quota Law of 1921,60 a temporary measure that
remained in place until 1924 when a permanent quota policy 61
was enacted by Congress. 62  The quota laws signaled another
subtle shift in immigration policy towards decreasing immigration
altogether.63 The quota policy implemented by the Immigration
Act of 1924 limited immigration by nationality, based on the
number of people of that nationality in the United States in 1920
up to 150,000.64 The result was a decrease in immigration of
nationalities governed by the quota system, particularly southern
and eastern European immigrants. 65 The restrictive limitations
on immigration that developed over the years remained largely
unchanged until 1952.
2. The Immigration and Nationality Act
In 1952, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA), which codified existing legislation, loosened some
restrictions barring naturalization of East Asians, and simplified
reunification of husbands and wives. 66  The most restrictive
aspect of the previous immigration laws, however-the national
origins quota system based on 1920 census statistics-remained
intact.67 While still largely restrictive, the more liberal elements
of the legislation were the result of the post-Cold War sentiment
which emphasized America's role as the leader of the free world.68
The national origins quota system was finally abolished in 1965
debate. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 74-75 (arguing, among other
things, that the system is illogical and unreasonable and discriminates
among immigrants on "the basis of accident of birth"); Patrick Weil, Races at
the Gate: A Century of Racial Distinctions in American Immigration Policy
(1865-1965), 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 625 (2001) (discussing the racial
undertones of the quota system).
60. Act of May 19, 1921, ch.8, 42 Stat 5. The Act implemented a quota
system which limited the number of aliens of any nationality that could
immigrate to the United States at 3% of the number of foreign born people of
the same nationality already residing in the United States as calculated by
the 1910 U.S. Census. Id. at § 2(a).
61. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153.
62. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.02[3].
63. See DANIELS, supra note 31, at 48-50.
64. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat 153, sec. 11(b).
65. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.02[3].
66. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 77.
67. See GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.04[1].
68. DANIELS, supra note 31, at 113.
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and replaced with a fixed quota system. 69 This change occurred
as a result of pressure from the Democratic platform of the early
1960s which described the national origins quota system as "a
policy of deliberate discrimination" contradicting "the founding
principles of this nation."70 The pressure for immigration reform
continued under the administration of President John F. Kennedy,
and abolition of the system came to fruition under the
administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson. 71 Other than
abolition of the national origins quota system, however,
immigration law remained largely restrictionist in scope, with the
focus always on control.7 2  The system remained largely
untouched until the mid-1980s, when the focus began to shift back
to employment and labor concerns. 73
3. The Immigration Reform and Control Act
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 198674 (IRCA)
represents the single most extensive change to U.S. immigration
laws since the demise of the quota system in 1965.75 Fear of
undocumented immigration was at a peak during the 1980s as a
result of economic factors including inflation, recession, runaway
interest rates, and the highest unemployment rates since the
Depression.7 6 Implemented as a result of national dissatisfaction
with an immigration policy that was ineffective in preventing
undocumented immigration, 77 the primary policy behind IRCA
was to deter illegal immigration. 78 IRCA aimed to reduce
undocumented immigration via a multi-directional approach
emphasizing three areas: first, controlling illegal immigration;
79
second, imposing penalties on employers80  who hired
69. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.04[3].
70. DANIELS, supra note 31, at 129.
71. Id. at 133-35.
72. Id. at 135.
73. GORDON, supra note 19, § 2.04[9][c].
74. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (1986).
75. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: IRCA AND THE
EXPERIENCE OF THE 1980s, at 2 (Frank D. Bean et al. eds., 1990).
76. See DANIELS, supra note 31, at 220.
77. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION, supra note 75, at 1-3.
78. Id. at 2.
79. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), at 45 (1986).
80. Id.
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undocumented immigrants;81 and third, allowing legalization for
certain undocumented immigrants already in the United States.8 2
While IRCA continued to place restrictions on immigration policy
in the United States, Congress emphasized that employer
sanctions were the "most humane, credible and effective way to
respond to the large-scale influx of undocumented aliens."83 Thus,
the focus of punitive sanctions was not on the immigrant as much
as it was on the employer.84 Furthermore, in making allowances
for undocumented immigrants already in the United States,
Congress focused not only on the contributions of these
immigrants, but also on their victimization and exploitation. 85
While the focus of overall immigration policy remained on
restriction, punishing undocumented immigrants was not in the
minds of our legislature. 86
4. Developments After IRCA
Since IRCA, various legislative acts have continued to place
controls on immigration to the United States. The Immigration
Act of 1990, a great example of the historical ambivalence of the
United States towards immigration, increased the number of
immigrants allowed into the United States in future years while
simultaneously restricting due process rights of deportees.8 7 By
the mid 1990s, the ambivalence tipped towards restriction with a
81. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION, supra note 75, at 2.
82. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), at 49 (1986).
83. Id. at 46.
84. See id. Jobs and the economic benefits that flow therefrom are a
primary motivator for immigration to the United States. Take the story of
Elmer Jacinto, for example. Adam Geller, One Country's Loss Is Another's
Gain, THE STANDARD-TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, at B6, available at http://
archive.southcoasttoday.com/daily/01.07/01- 14-07/O7perspective.htm. Mr.
Jacinto left the Philippines, where he was considered one of the nation's up
and coming doctors, to work in the United States as a nurse. Id. A doctor in
the Philippines makes between $300 and $800 per month whereas a nurse in
the United States makes $4,000 per month. Id.
85. H.R. Rep. No. 99-628(I), at 49 (1986).
86. Punishing undocumented immigrants is arguably counterproductive.
See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Stranger and Afraid: Undocumented Workers and
Federal Employment Law, 38 DEPAuL L. REV. 553 (1989) (arguing that
demand for undocumented workers can be decreased by affording
undocumented workers access to extensive remedies for employment law
violations).
87. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
2008]
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proposed ballot initiative in California that prohibited
undocumented immigrants from attending public schools.88 The
ambivalence culminated in 1996 with the passage of a series of
restrictive acts. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 199689 (IIRAIRA) restricted immigration by
increasing border patrols, increasing punishments for
immigration law violations, providing for the building of more
barriers on the United States/Mexico border, and placing 10-year
bans on admission for immigrants attempting to enter the United
States after having been illegally in the United States at any
time.90 Other acts passed during this time decreased the rights of
legal immigrants to food stamps and supplemental social security
income. 91 The tides had turned once again towards decreasing
immigration to the United States.
B. Evolution of Tort Law92
1. Early Developments
The political and economic pressures that influenced the
development of American immigration policy emphasizing
restriction and control lie in stark contrast to the amorphous
policies underlying the development of tort law in the United
States. While immigration law was slowly federalized in the late
88. See Philip Martin, Proposition 187 in California, 29 INT'L MIGRATION
REV. 255 (1995).
89. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
90. DANIELS, supra note 31, at 246.
91. Id. at 246-48.
92. The focus of Part II.B of this Note is the deterrence and compensation
functions of tort law and development of those functions through history.
This section is by no means meant to be an exhaustive analysis of tort
doctrine, which is beyond the scope of this Note. There are varying thoughts
on the purpose of tort law, theories behind tort law and whether the policies
behind the development of tort law are successfully served. The depth and
breadth of scholarly literature on the subject is limitless. See generally CARL
T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA (2001) (discussing the
regulatory nature of lawsuits); ROBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW
(1976) (compiling essays of varying viewpoints on tort theory); Victor E.
Schwartz et al., Toward Neutral Principles of Stare Decisis in Tort Law, 58
S.C. L. REV. (2006) (discussing neutral principles available to judges to
evaluate stare decisis while simultaneously changing tort law rules); Ernest
J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1989)
(discussing tort law theory from an instrumentalist viewpoint).
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1800s, 93 tort law evolved into its own distinct field of law.94 The
development of tort law was a direct result of the industrial
revolution, which brought with it not only jobs but also modern
machines and tools capable of crushing, slicing, and crippling
those who were unfortunate enough to cross their paths.95 With
modernization came increased risks, and by the late 1800s and
early 1900s industrial accidents accounted for about 35,000 deaths
and close to 2,000,000 injuries per year.9 6 The development of tort
law thus arose "out of the various and ever-increasing clashes of
the activities of persons living in a common society."97 Increased
modernization brought with it "losses, or injuries of many kinds
sustained by one person as the result of the activities of others."98
"The purpose of the law of torts was to adjust these losses and to
afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the
result of the conduct of another."9 9 The resulting system for
combating these newfound risks was one focused on negligence,
which arises when the conduct of one person fails to meet a
standard of reasonable care and results in injury to another. 10 0
Thus, an important policy underlying the development of tort law
was compensating individuals for injuries sustained as a result of
another person's faulty conduct. 101
While compensating the injured for their injuries was a
primary consideration of tort policy, there was some tension in the
early period of tort law resulting from the desire to redress the
injured as balanced against the economic growth and wealth
which in the late 1800s were thought to be for the "greater good of
society."'1 2  The same machines that happened to cut off one
man's finger were giving thousands of other men jobs, and
93. See supra Part II.A.
94. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
3 (1980).
95. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 262 (1973).
96. Id. at 422.
97. Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
238, 238 (1944).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. HENRY J. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION IN THE
COURTS: A STUDY OF TORT ACCIDENT LAW 18 (1987).
101. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (4th ed.
1971).
102. FRIEDMAN, supra note 95, at 410.
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producing, for example, railroad tracks that would be laid across
the country by tens of thousands of other men. 10 3  There was
concern about placing so much liability on companies that it would
still the American economy. 10 4 The courts developed numerous
doctrines to counter these concerns. The doctrine of contributory
negligence came into use in the United States in the 1850s, forcing
any plaintiff in a personal injury case not only to prove that
defendants were negligent but also to show that the plaintiff
herself was faultless. 10 5 In 1842, the fellow-servant rule, which
barred employees from suing their employers for injuries caused
by the negligence of other employees, developed in American
courts.106 Other doctrines, such as the doctrine of immunity of
charities, 10 7 assumption of risk,10 8 and the doctrine of imputed
negligence, 10 9 continued to immunize companies from tort
actions.110 Negligence theory during this time period in history
had a marked affect on the ability of tort law to function as a
compensatory system.111 Arguably, during these early stages, tort
law was primarily about balancing economic interests against the
welfare of the injured, with a slight tendency to favor industry. 112
Despite the fact that tort law development in the 1800s was
quite restrictionist, the courts were loath to encourage
carelessness. 113  After all, another equally important policy
behind the development of tort law was that of impeding socially
103. This hypothetical is not based on any statistical information and is
merely used as an example.
104. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 95, at 410-12.
105. See Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41
ILL. L. REV. 151, 151 (1946).
106. See Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. 49 (1842).
107. The doctrine of immunity of charities protected charitable entities
such as hospitals from liability as a result of the negligence of employees or
others on their premises. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 95, at 416.
108. See, e.g., Lamson v. Am. Axe & Tool Co., 58 N.E. 585, 585 (1900)
(holding that an employee who understands a danger and takes the risk is
barred from suing his employer for negligence).
109. This doctrine imputed the negligence of a parent to his child and a
driver to his passenger resulting in the child or passenger being unable to
recover for his or her injury. FRIEDMAN, supra note 95, at 417.
110. Id. at 416-17.
111. WHITE, supra note 94, at 61.
112. TORT LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY: MAJOR HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS,
at xiii, (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987).
113. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 95, at 417.
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unreasonable conduct." 4 The more that people are held liable for
injuring others, the stronger the incentive to prevent similar
harms from occurring. 1 5 Therefore, the driving force behind
liberal changes in tort policy during this time period was the goal
to counter the restrictionist nature of early developments in tort
law. 116  Judges rejected the doctrine of imputed negligence. 11 7
The vice-principal doctrine developed, allowing injured employees
to sue their employers if their injuries were due to the negligence
of a supervisor.1 18 Legislative acts imposed higher standards of
care on tortfeasors, 1 19 created negligence per se laws, 120 and
imposed safety regulations on corporations. 12 1 Finally, many of
the restrictionist rules were rejected by juries, who would "let
their hearts dictate results."'122 While ultimately the restrictionist
developments of the 1800s exceeded the expansionist
developments, the policies of compensation and deterrence
survived.
2. Early 20th Century Developments
The early 20th century saw a general stability in the system of
tort law, with cases during this period tending to clarify tort
doctrine. 123 Some change did occur during this period, however,
particularly in the area of causation.1 24  These developments
resulted from a shift in theoretical legal thought, from a more
scientific methodology to one largely influenced by the realism of
the 1900s. 125 The nature of legal analysis took a turn toward
more policy-oriented doctrine.' 26 According to some scholars, the
114. PROSSER, supra note 101, § 5.
115. Id. § 4.
116. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 95, at 417-25.
117. See id. at 417 (citing Little v. Hackett, 116 U.S. 366 (1885); Bunting
v. Hogsett, 21 Atl. 31 (1891)).
118. See WHITE, supra note 94, at 51-55.
119. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 95, at 419.
120. Id. at 419-20.
121. Id. at 420-21.
122. Id. at 423.
123. Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 605 (1992).
124. See WHITE, supra note 94, at 93-102.
125. See id. at 91-93.
126. Id. at 98.
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case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad127 marked the shift in the
concept of causation, from a legal doctrine to an issue of public
policy. 128  The Palsgraf case involved two men, one carrying a
package, trying to board a train. 129 The guard on the train tried
to help the men onto the train as it moved away and, in the
process, dislodged the package, which fell to the rails and
exploded.' 30 Mrs. Palsgraf, who was standing near the platform
but at a distance, was hit in the head by a scale that fell as a
result of the explosion. 13 1 The Cardozo majority opinion focused
on the fact that the railroad owed no duty to Mrs. Palsgraf
because she was not within the zone of danger, making her injury
unforeseeable.' 32  The Andrews dissent was policy-driven,
reasoning that everyone owed "to the world a large duty of
refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the
safety of others."'1 33  After this decision, causation was
increasingly seen as an aspect of tort theory that involved policy
considerations such as fairness and social justice.' 34 This policy
shift complemented the notions of redress and deterrence that had
originally influenced the development of tort law.
3. The Mid to Late 20th Century Developments
Spurred by the public policy activism of the 1960s, which
abolished the national origin quota system, 135 the mid to late 20th
century signaled a further shift in tort theory, strengthening the
deterrence and compensation policies of tort law with the
expansion of tort liability. 136 The scope of liability broadened with
the abolition of immunities for charities and government. 137
Comparative negligence replaced the contributory negligence; the
latter had barred recovery for plaintiffs bearing any responsibility
127. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
128. See WHITE, supra note 94, at 101.
129. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 100.
133. Id. at 102-03 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
134. WHITE, supra note 94, at 101.
135. See supra Part II.A.
136. Schwartz, supra note 123, at 601.
137. Id. at 605-06.
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for the negligence, while the new doctrine merely apportioned
liability, allowing plaintiffs some recovery.1 38  The National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966139 was a response to
the realization that the most effective way to address highway
safety and decrease injuries and deaths was through better
product design. 140 The 1972 Consumer Product and Safety Act1 4 1
placed a new emphasis on protecting consumers and deterring
poor manufacturing practices.142  The policymakers of the era
therefore emphasized and promoted the deterrence function of tort
doctrine.
From the late 20th century to the present, the trend of
expanding liability has slowed, largely as a result of lobbying by
corporations concerned about the skyrocketing cost of liability.1 43
There have been a couple of notable exceptions, one in the area of
medical malpractice: the loss of chance doctrine allows patients to
recover in instances where doctors negligently diagnose their
conditions, even if their pre-diagnosis chances of recovery were
less than 50%.144 There was also an increase in the ability of
crime victims to sue landlords, public agents, and agencies for
negligence.1 4 5 However, expansion of liability has been largely
curtailed as a result of the legislative movement towards tort
reform. 14 6 This type of tort reform focuses on reforming punitive
damages and pain and suffering damages, and on revising rules
for joint and several liability.14 7  Even so, the principles of
deterrence and compensation remain alive and well hundreds of
years after their development.
138. See id. at 606.
139. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966).
140. See Schwartz, supra note 123, at 612-13.
141. Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat.
1207 (1972).
142. See Schwartz, supra note 123, at 612-13.
143. Id. at 691.
144. Lars Noah, An Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in Applying the
Loss-of-Chance Doctrine, 24 REV. LITIG. 369, 370-72 (2005).
145. See Schwartz, supra note 123, at 649-50.
146. Id. at 681.
147. Id.
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C. Countervailing Interests of Immigration Law and Tort Law
When comparing the underlying purposes of immigration law
and tort law, it is notable from the historical development of each
area of law that each serves a separate and distinct function in
our society.1 48 Moreover, these functions lead in two very different
directions. Immigration legislation, often influenced by the
prevailing political winds, serves to appease the masses by
excluding the powerless, whereas tort law serves to protect the
masses by holding .negligent companies and people accountable for
their actions, and by allowing the injured to be compensated for
the injuries they have suffered.' 49  Because each area of law
serves a distinct and arguably useful1 50 function, the question
then becomes whether or not awarding lost wages to
undocumented immigrants in personal injury actions serves the
policies of each area of law. Despite what may seem like
countervailing interests, the policies of both tort law and
immigration law are best served by awarding lost wages to
undocumented immigrants in personal injury actions based on
American wage rates.
III. BASING LOST WAGE AWARDS ON AMERICAN WAGE RATES
A. The Country-Wide Inconsistencies
In awarding lost wages to undocumented immigrants in
personal injury actions, courts across the country take four
general routes. First, courts allow lost wages to be based on
American wage rates. 151 Second, courts limit the award of lost
148. See supra Part I.
149. Id.
150. In implementing the term "useful" by no means is it my intent to
support the current state of immigration law. It is likely that there are those
who would disagree that tort law as it stands today serves any useful
purpose. However, the purpose of this Note is to address the viability and
utility of awarding lost wages in personal injury actions of undocumented
immigrants only.
151. See Hernandez v. M/V Rajaan, 848 F.2d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 1988)
(affirming award of future lost wages); Barros v. E.W. Bliss Co., Civ. A. No.
91-126330Z, 1993 WL 99930, at *2 (D. Mass. 1993); Hagl v. Stern, 396 F.
Supp. 779, 779 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d
1246, 1260 (N.Y. 2006); Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 802 N.Y.S.2d
56, 70 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2005), affd sub nom. Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC,
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wages to wages immigrants would earn in their country of
origin.1 52  Third, courts elect not to award any lost wages
whatsoever for undocumented immigrants.1 53 Finally, courts give
juries1 54 the opportunity to award wages based on either
American wage rates or country of origin wage rates.1 5 5  The
inconsistencies in lost wage awards arise as a result of some
courts emphasizing policies underlying immigration law156 while
other courts emphasize policies underlying tort law.' 57  These
845 N.E.2d 1246 (2006); Collins v. N.Y. City Health and Hosp. Corp., 607
N.Y.S.2d 387, 388 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994); Klapa v. O&Y Liberty Plaza Co.,
645 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282 (Sup. 1996) (pertaining to future lost wages); Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W. 3d 233, 247 (Tex. App. 2003); Peterson v.
Neme, 281 S.E.2d 869, 874 (Va. 1981).
152. See Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. Civ. A. 01-1241-JTM, 2003
WL 22519678, at *7 (D. Kan. 2003) (pertaining to future lost wages); Sanango
v. 200 East 16th St. Housing Corp., 788 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316-19 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 2004); Jallow v. Kew Gardens Hills Apartments Owners, No.
28907/2003, 2005 WL 1712206, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (pertaining to both
past and future lost wages).
153. See Veliz v. Rental Serv. Corp. USA, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1334
(D. Fla. 2003).
154. In these cases, juries are allowed to weigh evidence of immigration
status. For an analysis of evidentiary issues relating to immigration status,
see Benny Agosto, Jr. and Jason B. Ostrom, Can the Injured Migrant Worker's
Alien Status Be Introduced at Trial?, 30 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 383 (2005)
(examining how evidence of immigration status is used in American courts
and ways to safeguard against admissibility of status).
155. See Madeira v. Affordable Housing Found., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 504,
507 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (conceding that immigration status was relevant to
determining lost wages but holding that the jury's award based on U.S.
wages should stand); Mischalski v. Ford Motor Co., 935 F. Supp 203, 207
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that while immigration status could not be
considered to calculate damages, it could be used in calculating lost wages);
Rodriguez v. Kline, 232 Cal.Rptr. 157, 158 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1986)
(discussing that it is for the court to decide whether or not lost wages shall be
calculated based on U.S. rates or limited to country of citizenship); Melendres
v. Soales, 306 N.W.2d 399, 402 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (allowing jury to
consider immigration status in calculating lost wages); Rosa v. Partners in
Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994 (N.H. 2005); Oro v. 23 East 79th St. Corp., 810
N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (Sup. App. Term 2005) (holding that immigration status
could be considered in awarding lost wages); Echeverria v. Lindner, No.
018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (allowing
immigration status to be considered in determining future lost wages).
156. See, e.g., Veliz, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1335; Hernandez-Cortez, 2003 WL
22519678, at *6.
157. See, e.g., Madeira, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 507; Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus
Lines, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 576, 577 (N.D. Ill. 1936); Rosa, 868 A.2d at 1000;
Majlinger 802 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
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inconsistencies reveal the tensions the courts face in both
considering fairness to the injured and honoring the purposes of
immigration law and tort law. To compound the problem, the
Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of awarding lost
wages in personal injury actions of undocumented immigrants;
thus, the states are left to fend for themselves.
158
In considering awards of lost wages for undocumented
immigrants in personal injury actions, a tri-focal pattern evolves:
first, because there is no Supreme Court decision with respect to
lost wages in personal injury actions, proponents rely on Hoffman
as applicable to personal injury actions. 159 Second, the courts
focus on preemption of state tort law by federal immigration
policy. 160 Finally, the courts emphasize the policy arguments for
and against both tort law and immigration law. 161 However, a
closer examination of cases across the United States will show
that awarding "American" lost wages to undocumented
immigrants promotes the policies behind both immigration law
and tort law despite their countervailing interests.
B. The Role of Hoffman Plastics in Tort Actions
Although there is no Supreme Court decision on awarding lost
wages to undocumented immigrants in personal injury actions,
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB 162 and its predecessor
Sure-Tan v. NLRB 163 are often cited as a bar to such awards.
64
158. However, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of awarding
lost wages to undocumented immigrants who were fired by their employers
for participating in unions. The Court has held that awarding lost wages
would be counter to federal immigration policy. Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 137 (2002); Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891
(1984). While advocates of prohibiting lost wage awards argued that
Hoffman and Sure-Tan apply to personal injury actions, the courts have
overwhelmingly rejected the argument. See Rosa, 868 A. 2d at 1000; Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W. 3d 233, 244 (Tex. 2003). Hoffman and Sure-
Tan are discussed further infra Part III.C. For a further look at how lost
wage awards for undocumented immigrants are treated in various areas of
law after Sure-Tan, see Timothy M. Cox, A Call To Revisit Sure-Tan v.
NLRB: Undocumented Workers and Their Right to Back Pay, 30 Sw. U. L.
REV. 505 (2001).
159. See supra Part III.B.
160. See supra Part III.C.
161. See supra Part III.D.
162. 535 U.S. at 137.
163. 467 U.S. at 883.
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In the Hoffman case, Jose Castro, who was not legally authorized
to work in the United States, was laid off from his employment
with Hoffman Plastic Compounds as a result of his participation
in a union organizing campaign. 16 5 Castro filed a complaint with
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) arguing that the
layoff violated the National Labor Relations Act. 16 6 The NLRB
agreed with Castro and ordered back pay from the date of
termination to the date the employer discovered Castro was
unable to work. 16 7  Hoffman Plastic Compounds petitioned for
review, arguing that IRCA, which made it unlawful to both
employ undocumented immigrants and to use fraudulent
documents to gain employment as an undocumented immigrant,
precluded the NLRB from awarding back pay. 168 The Supreme
Court agreed with the petitioner and held that "federal
immigration policy, as expressed by Congress in IRCA, foreclosed
the Board from awarding back pay to an undocumented alien who
has never been legally authorized to work in the United
States."'169 The Court reasoned that in enacting IRCA, Congress
had implemented a comprehensive scheme to deter the
employment of undocumented immigrants, and that allowing a
back pay award in a labor dispute violated specific prohibitions of
federal immigration law.
170
While there have been numerous attempts to apply Hoffman
in personal injury cases, 17 1 such application poses several
164. See Madeira v. Affordable Housing Found., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 504,
507 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. Civ. A. 01-1241-
JTM, 2003 WL 22519678, at *6 (D. Kan. 2003); Majlinger v. Cassino
Contracting Corp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 56, 60 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2005); Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W.3d 233, 243 (Tex. 2003).
165. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 137.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 138.
171. See Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. Civ. A. 01-1241-JTM, 2003
WL 22519678, at *1 (D. Kan. 2003); Uribe v. Aviles, No. B166839, 2004 WL
2385135, at *1 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2004); Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845
N.E.2d 1246, 1260 (N.Y. 2006); Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 802
N.Y.S.2d 56, 58 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2005); Sanango v. 200 East 16th St.
Housing Corp., 788 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2004); Jallow v.
Kew Gardens Hills Apartments Owners, No. 28907/2003, 2005 WL 1712206,
at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Gonzalez v. Franklin, 383 N.W.2d 907, 909 (Wis.
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problems due to the limited holding of Hoffman. The Hoffman
court's decision involved resolving an apparent conflict between
two federal statutes, IRCA and the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"). 72 In contrast, tort actions are generally governed by
state statutory regulation. Further, a prevailing issue in Hoffman
was the conflict between IRCA's purpose of deterring employment
of undocumented workers and awarding lost wages as a result of
employer violations of NLRA. 173  Federal labor law governs
employer/employee relationships. The same cannot be said,
however, for cases that arise under tort law. Tort law does not
regulate employer/employee relationships but governs negligent
behavior by negligent parties regardless of whether such a party
is an employer, a friend, or a stranger. Many personal injury
cases arise as a result of car accidents, 174 medical malpractice, 175
fireworks injuries, 176 slips and falls,177 and subcontractor work, 178
to name a few. Furthermore, while the undocumented
immigrants in Hoffman were unnecessarily terminated from their
employment, they did not suffer any physical injuries that
prevented them from working or living their daily lives. 179 In
contrast, when undocumented immigrants seek lost wages under
tort law, they suffer physical, sometimes permanent injuries.
Hoffman, which resolved a labor law conflict, is thus inapplicable
in personal injury cases, and this view is supported by courts
across the country.
Courts across the United States overwhelmingly reject
application of Hoffman to tort actions of undocumented
immigrants. While the court in a New York case, Madeira v.
1986).
172. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 137-41.
173. Id. at 137-39.
174. Hernandez-Cortez, 2003 WL 22519678, at *1; Uribe 2004 WL
2385135, at *1; Rodriguez, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
175. Collins v. N.Y. City Health and Hosp. Corp., 607 N.Y.S.2d 387, 388
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994).
176. Gonzalez, 383 N.W.2d at 909.
177. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Cordova, 856 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex. 1993).
178. Madeira v. Affordable Housing Found., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 504, 505
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Hagl v. Stern, 396 F. Supp. 779, 781 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 56, 58 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 2005); Cano v. Mallory Mgmt., 760 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (Sup. 2003).
179. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 137
(2002).
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Affordable Housing Foundation, Inc., found that the plaintiffs
immigration status was relevant to determining the nature and
extent of the lost wage award, the court explicitly rejected the
defendant's argument that, pursuant to the decision in Hoffman,
an award of lost wages would be in contravention of IRCA.
180
Beside the fact that the case was based on diversity jurisdiction,
an award of lost wages to an undocumented immigrant in a
personal injury action based on state common law does not offend
the holding of Hoffman, the court held, because Hoffman does not
bar undocumented immigrants from utilizing state courts to seek
compensation for a defendant's tortious conduct. 181 The Majlinger
court dismissed Hoffman along the same lines, arguing that to
read Hoffman as extending to personal injury actions would
expand Hoffman's limited holding. 182  In Tyson Foods Inc., v.
Guzman, the Texas Appellate Court also rejected application of
Hoffman in personal injury actions. 183  While the defendant
argued that Hoffman precluded awarding undocumented
immigrants lost wages, the court's analysis of Hoffman limited its
scope. 184 The Tyson case involved a common law personal injury
claim, whereas Hoffman involved an employer's violation of labor
laws.' 85 Thus, the lower court's award of past and future lost
wages was upheld as to Mr. Guzman, who was injured when hit
by a forklift as he rounded up chickens.18 6 Overall, the courts go
to great lengths to distinguish between the Hoffman line of cases,
which involved labor policy considerations, and personal injury
cases, which involve disputes between two private citizens as a
result of tortious conduct. 187
Even where a court applied Hoffman to a personal injury
case, this application was limited in scope. 188  In Hernandez-
180. Madeira, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 506-07.
181. Id. at 507.
182. Majlinger, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
183. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W.3d 233, 243-44 (Tex. 2003).
184. Id. at 244.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 237-47.
187. Hernandez v. M/V Rajaan, 848 F.2d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 1988).
188. See Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. Civ. A. 01-1241-JTM, 2003
WL 22519678, at *6 (D. Kan. 2003). Plaintiff who was injured in a motor
vehicle accident sought an award of past and future lost wages and defendant
argued that Hoffman precluded plaintiff from being awarded U.S. wages
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Cortez, the only personal injury case to use Hoffman, the plaintiffs
were injured in a car accident while being illegally transported
from Mexico to North Carolina.189 The plaintiffs sought past and
future lost wages based on projected earnings rather than on
actual earnings. 190  The court agreed with the plaintiffs'
contention that Hoffman did not preclude the ability of
undocumented immigrants to recover wages for work actually
performed. 191 However, the court distinguished the instant case
from other personal injury cases which rejected the application of
Hoffman, because in the instant case there were no wages earned
and no actual work performed. 192  The court was unwilling to
award lost wages based on an entirely imaginary figure. 193 The
court relied heavily on the fact that the undocumented
immigrants in this case did not work at all in the United
States. 194 Application of Hoffman in this particular case did not,
therefore, support any arguments that Hoffman should be applied
generally in other personal injury actions because
Hernandez-Cortez is so easily distinguished. Personal injury cases
rejecting Hoffman have all involved injured parties who sought
lost wage awards based on actual work in the United States, 195
unlike the instant case.
C. State Tort Law and the Preemption Argument
1. Preemption Basics
Courts which bar lost wage awards often rely on federal
immigration legislation which allegedly preempts such awards.
Deterring the employment of undocumented immigrants in the
United States is a focal point of federal immigration law. 196
Specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a 197 bars the employment of
because he was not able to work legally in the United States; the court still
allowed the plaintiff to claim lost wages based on earnings in Mexico. Id.
189. Id. at *1.
190. Id.
191. Id. at *6.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. at *3-*6.
195. See supra Part III.B.
196. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006).
197. Id.
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undocumented immigrants,198 provides mechanisms by which an
employer is to examine the appropriate documentation of
employees, 199 and includes penalties for employers who fail to
abide by the statutory provisions. 20 0 The argument that develops
in cases wherein undocumented immigrants seek lost wage
awards for their personal injuries is that the "wages" earned in
the past, or those that could be earned in the future, are a result
of illegal employment in the United States.20 1  Because
immigration law seeks to deter employment of undocumented
immigrants, courts have argued that federal immigration policy
preempts any lost wage award based on illegal employment. 20 2
Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress is empowered to
preempt state law.203 Preemption arises in one of three ways.
First, state law may be preempted by explicit statutory language,
known as express preemption. 204 Second, "[i]n the absence of
explicit statutory language signaling an intent to preempt, a court
may infer such intent where Congress has legislated
comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regulation."20 5 This
type of preemption is known as field preemption. Third, federal
law preempts a state law that stands as an obstacle to the
purposes of the federal law, a type of preemption known as conflict
preemption. 20 6  Thus, unless a state statute is expressly
preempted, field preempted, or conflict preempted, it will survive
the Supremacy Clause. In the case of awarding lost wages to
undocumented immigrants in personal injury actions, such
awards survive all three prongs of the analysis.
2. Express Preemption
There is little contention as to whether or not a lost wage
award to documented immigrants in personal injury actions is
198. Id. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) & (B).
199. Id. § 1324a(b).
200. Id. § 1324a(e)(4).
201. Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1250 (N.Y. 2006).
202. Id. at 1254.
203. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
204. P.G. & E. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 203 (1983).
205. Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n. of Kansas,
489 U.S. 493, 509 (1989).
206. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000).
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expressly preempted by federal immigration policy, particularly
IRCA. Federal immigration statutes only preempt "any State or
local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon those who
employ"20 7 undocumented immigrants. Congress thus limited
express preemption to sanctions against employers, not
employees. For example, in summarily rejecting the express
preemption argument, the Majlinger court reasoned that in
enacting IRCA, Congress gave no indication nor did it provide that
undocumented immigrants would be barred from their ability to
sue in state courts for personal injuries or barred from the right to
recover lost wages.20 8 What Congress did choose to do was to
implement employer sanctions. 20
9
3. Field Preemption
While the federal government has the exclusive authority to
regulate immigration,210 this authority cannot be construed to
give the federal government exclusive authority to regulate
immigration through tort law. The premise on which field
preemption arguments are based is that field preemption
prohibits an award of lost wages because the federal government
has exclusive authority to regulate immigration, and this power
was exercised by Congress in its enactment of INA and IRCA.211
While this may be true, such an argument fails to consider that
lost wage awards in personal injury actions are based on state tort
law which is not a regulatory "arm" or extension for immigration
policy. Any lost wage awards that result from a personal injury
action are a result of tort policy, not immigration policy. Take, for
example, the case of Gorgonio Balbuena, a native of Mexico, who
suffered severe head trauma after falling from a ramp while
pushing a wheelbarrow, then sought redress under common law
negligence and labor law theories. 212 The court quickly dismissed
the defense's field preemption argument, noting that while IRCA
occupied the spectrum of immigration law, the state law in this
207. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006).
208. Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 56, 62 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 2005).
209. Id. at 68.
210. See supra Part II.A.
211. Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1250 (N.Y. 2006).
212. Id.
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case occupied regulation of health and safety. 213  In fact, the
federal government does not occupy the field of common-law torts,
which is traditionally an area of state control.2 14 Thus, an award
of lost wages in personal injury actions does not fall within the
scope of field preemption.
4. Conflict Preemption
Awarding lost wages to undocumented immigrants under
state tort law is not an obstacle to Congress' objectives in
implementing IRCA or federal immigration policy in general.2 1 5
The manner in which Congress intended to combat illegal
immigration via adoption of IRCA and other immigration statutes
supports the notion that such awards are not counter to federal
immigration law. 2 16 As previously discussed, federal immigration
law, including IRCA, places a burden on employers only. 2 17 It was
never the intent of Congress to place immigrants, documented or
undocumented, in a position of undue hardship or suffering.
2 18
Historically, Congress chose not to punish undocumented
immigrants by making "their contracts void and thus unjustifiably
enriching employers of such alien laborers."2 19 To the contrary,
while Congress could very well implement legislation penalizing
undocumented immigrants for accepting jobs or preventing
undocumented immigrants from collecting lost wages, Congress
has chosen not to do so.220
In addition, occupational health and safety falls under the
broad police power of states, and barring access to lost wage
claims by injured undocumented workers decreases employer
incentives to abide by the state's labor laws.2 2 1 Rejection of the
conflict preemption argument by the courts is even more
understandable in light of the fact that IRCA's legislative history
expressly indicates that there was no intent "to undermine or
213. Id. at 1256.
214. Majlinger, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
215. See id. at 66.
216. Id. at 62.
217. See supra Part II.A.
218. Id.
219. Majlinger, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 62 (citing Gates v. Rivers Constr. Co., 515
P.2d 1020, 1023 (Alaska 1973)).
220. Id.
221. Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1257 (N.Y. 2006).
2008] 557
558 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 13:529
diminish in any way labor protections in existing law."
222
Furthermore, awarding lost wages in tort actions is
complementary rather than contradictory to immigration policy
because it makes the employment of undocumented immigrants
less attractive to "unscrupulous employers." 223  "Only by
equalizing defendants' potential liability for injuries to authorized
and unauthorized workers can the objectives underlying both
federal immigration law and this State's tort law and workplace
safety statutes be realized. 224
D. Policy Battle: Immigration vs. Tort Law
1. Where to Draw the Line
If Hoffman is inapplicable to personal injury cases because of
its limited scope and state tort law is not preempted by federal
immigration law, then there should be no problem with awarding
American rate lost wages to undocumented immigrants in
personal injury actions. Furthermore, in addition to legal
arguments that support awarding American lost wages to
undocumented immigrants, policy factors support the theory.
Underlying the majority of court decisions in such personal injury
cases is the struggle to balance the countervailing interests in tort
law and immigration law. Historically, tort law serves the
function of compensating injured parties and deterring negligent
behavior. 225  Immigration law serves to control the flow of
immigration into the United States. Strict enforcement of tort law
principles will promote the policies behind both tort law and
immigration law.
22 6
2. Enforcement of Tort Policies
Juliet Neme was struck by a car while crossing the street.2 27
Mr. Rosa was severely injured when an aerial lift tipped over and
fell on him while he was working. 228 Mr. Hagl's employer was
222. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), at 58 (1986).
223. Balbuena, 845 N.E.2d at 1266.
224. Majlinger, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
225. See supra Part II.B.
226. See supra Part III.D.
227. Peterson v. Neme, 281 S.E.2d 869, 870 (Va. 1981).
228. Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 996 (N.H. 2005).
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hired by a factory to do some welding work and, because of the
factory's negligence, Mr. Hagl fell into an open grease pit.2 29 Mr.
Melendres was enjoying an employee picnic when he decided to
join in the fun of diving into a lake from the dock. 230 The facility
owners had not posted any signs barring diving or jumping into
the lake. 231 Other people at the picnic had been diving into the
lake. 232 Unfortunately, unlike the others, Mr. Melendres's last
dive into murky waters of the lake left him paralyzed.233 All of
these people have several things in common: they are all
undocumented immigrants working in the United States, they
were all seriously injured and, most importantly, they all lost
wages as a result of their injuries. 234 Under tort principles, the
losses these injured parties bore, including lost wages, should be
redressed. 235  However, barring or decreasing recovery to the
injured if they are undocumented immigrants places the emphasis
on immigration control and not the principles of tort law.
In upholding an undocumented immigrant's right to lost wage
awards based on American rates of pay, courts should emphasize
the compensatory function of tort law. Someone who is injured as
a result of another party's negligence has a right to recover
damages for his injury. 236 The right to recover lost wages is not
limited to Americans but is a right that runs to immigrants
regardless of whether or not they are appropriately
documented.237 What is important is not the injured party's
immigration status, but redressing a wrong that has occurred. 238
Deterrence should also be a primary consideration in
awarding lost wages to undocumented immigrants. Even courts
that express some disfavor with the policy of awarding "American"
lost wages come to the conclusion that doing so is important for
the deterrence function of tort law. When Mr. Rosa filed a
229. Hagl v. Stern, 396 F. Supp. 779, 779 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
230. Melendres v. Soales, 306 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See supra notes 174-178.
235. See supra Part II.B.
236. Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 576, 577 (N.D. Ill.
1936).
237. Id.
238. Id.
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negligence claim against various defendants as a result of injuries
he sustained when an aerial lift tipped over and fell on him, he
sought damages which included a claim for lost wages at United
States wage rates. 239  The Superior Court of New Hampshire
transferred questions to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire all
surrounding the issue of whether or not the defendant was
entitled to lost wages. 240 The Supreme Court acknowledged the
strong policies against awarding lost wages at U.S. rates in light
of the policies underlying federal immigration law.241 However, in
the same instance, the court recognized that the deterrence
principles of tort doctrine are in and of themselves an important
enough policy to allow lost wage awards against employers who
"knew or should have known" of the worker's status. 242 The court
found the fact that tort liability acts as a deterrent to reduce the
risk of injuries to be compelling.243  As Justice Dalianis so
eloquently put it:
To refuse to allow recovery against a person responsible.
. . would provide an incentive for such persons to target
illegal aliens for employment in the most dangerous jobs
or to provide illegal aliens with substandard working
conditions. It would allow such persons to treat illegal
aliens as disposable commodities who may be replaced
the moment they are damaged. Such a result is
incompatible with tort deterrence principles. 244
Thus, the deterrence function of tort law has been a primary
consideration when the courts undertake to allow lost wage
awards in the personal injury actions of undocumented
immigrants.
3. Immigration Policy in Tort Decisions
Even as they promote tort policy, lost wages awards also serve
the secondary role of furthering federal immigration policy.
Holding a defendant liable for lost wages regardless of the
239. Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 996 (N.H. 2005).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1000.
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. Id.
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plaintiffs immigrant status is compatible with and promotes the
IRCA's policy of deterring employment of undocumented
immigrants. 2 45  Preventing undocumented immigrants from
access to all remedies would not promote federal immigration
policy, but would create incentives for employers to hire
undocumented immigrants, "secure in the knowledge that such
employees would have no recourse in pursuing proper wages..."
for their injuries.2 4 6 By holding a negligent party as accountable
to an undocumented immigrant as that party would be to an
American employee, courts can reduce the incentive to hire
undocumented workers. 24 7 Enforcement of tort law thus not only
supports the deterrence and compensation principles of tort law,
but also enforces deterrence of the hiring of undocumented
immigrants-the actual purpose of IRCA. 248
In addition to serving as a deterrent to the hiring of
undocumented immigrants, awarding lost wages in tort actions
serves federal immigration policy by keeping the burden on
employers, thus comporting with the intent of IRCA.24 9 Under
IRCA, the emphasis is not on the duty of employees but on the
affirmative duty of employers to make sure that employees are
properly authorized to work in the United States.2 50 The intent of
IRCA was to hold employers accountable for unauthorized
employment; in fact, sanctions under IRCA are against employers,
not undocumented immigrants. 2 51 Employers could avoid liability
issues by not hiring undocumented immigrants. 25 2 As opposed to
frustrating the policy objectives of IRCA, awarding lost wages
supports these policies.
2 53
245. Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 56, 58 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 2005).
246. Id. at 66.
247. Id.
248. See id.
249. See supra Part II.A.
250. Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1001 (N.H. 2005)
(citing Zamora v. Elite Logistics, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1119 (D. Kan.
2004)).
251. Majlinger, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
252. Rosa, 868 A.2d at 1000.
253. See id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Injured plaintiffs who are deprived of their ability to work
because of their injuries should be able to avail themselves of all
tort remedies, including lost wage awards, regardless of their
immigration status. Not only should undocumented immigrants
be allowed to collect lost wage awards in tort actions, those
awards must be based on American wage rates. Regardless of
immigration status, undocumented immigrants who seek lost
wage awards have, with limited exceptions, worked in the United
States. As a result of injuries sustained due to another's
negligence, they are prevented from continuing to work to their
previous capacity. Tort law is about compensating the injured.
When a plaintiff seeks a lost wage award, he is merely seeking to
be compensated for his loss. Immigration status has absolutely
nothing to do with the loss suffered. If an immigrant was earning
an American wage before his injury, his compensation should be
that same American wage.
Tort law also serves as a deterrent to future negligence. This
deterrent effect in and of itself is an important reason to award
American lost wages to undocumented immigrants. We send a
dangerous message when we punish the injured and not the
tortfeasor by limiting or rejecting their ability to collect lost wage
awards. Not only are we sending the message that undocumented
immigrants are a disposable commodity but we are also conveying
the message that unsafe work conditions, unsafe products, poor
driving skills, and other negligent behaviors are completely
acceptable. To diminish the ability of undocumented immigrants
to collect American lost wages is to eliminate the deterrence
function of tort law.
Finally, awarding American lost wages to undocumented
immigrants in personal injury actions keeps immigration as a
secondary issue, which is where it should be in tort decisions.
Basing tort law decisions on immigration policy is nothing less
than dangerous. Such decisions diminish the efficacy of tort law.
More importantly, decisions that focus on immigration policy
remove the burden of setting immigration policy from its rightful
owners, the legislature and the federal government. If, in fact,
there is an immigration "problem," it is the legislature's job to fix
it. "[Ejnforcement of immigration laws is the role of the
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Immigration and Naturalization Service. .. 254 not the courts that
are sought out by plaintiffs to remedy their injuries.
While immigration policy should take a back seat in tort law
decisions, awarding American wages to undocumented
immigrants in personal injury actions actually promotes
principles of immigration law, diminishing the strength of any
arguments to the contrary. A* broad range of immigration
legislation focuses on employers. 2 55  In implementing IRCA,
Congress emphasized that employer sanctions were the most
appropriate way to deal with the issue of undocumented
immigration, which is largely a function of economic necessity. 25 6
Failing to award American lost wages in personal injury actions
thus diminishes the deterrence function of employer sanctions
imposed by immigration legislation further compounding the
immigration "problem." Employers have no reason to discontinue
illegal hiring practices if those practices result in economic benefit
to employers.
Perhaps the best way to enforce access to lost wages and other
remedies in tort actions is for the states to implement legislation
protecting the rights of immigrants in tort actions. Presently,
California is the only state that legislates that all people,
regardless of immigration status, have access to all "protections,
rights and remedies available under state law."2 5 7 This type of
legislation protects immigrants and allows tort law to function as
it was intended. Further, this type of legislation sends a message
that may not have much to do with the law but says a great deal
about our nation and its policies; that the injured should be
treated fairly and with dignity regardless of who they are or where
they come from. In the words of President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
"remember, remember always that all of us, and you and I
especially, are descended from immigrants and revolutionists.' 58
254. Cano v. Mallory Mgmt., 760 N.Y.S.2d 816, 818 (Sup. 2003). The
Immigration and Naturalization Service no longer exists and enforcement of
federal immigration laws is the responsibility of the Department of
Homeland Security.
255. See supra Part II.A.
256. Id.
257. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3339(a) (2006).
258. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, REMARKS BEFORE THE DAUGHTERS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL 21, 1938, published in THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 259 (1941).
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